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TWO PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN VIRGINIA LAW-A
CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE AND A CONSUMER FRAUD
LAWt
Henry E. Howell, Jr.*
I.
Introduction
This article encompasses two proposals for change in the law of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, one procedural and the other sub-
stantive. A proposed class action procedure law and a substantive
consumer fraud law are set forth in the appendix and discussed,
herein. Credit law reform is beyond the scope of this article.' The
proposals are independent, although similar, in that they are de-
signed to help the small claimant obtain relief for injuries for which
there is presently no practical remedy under Virginia law.
While class action procedure is known to the common law of
Virginia, its scope is very limited. A law in this area could expand
the class action device in Virginia to cover cases involving damages
and would give the Virginia courts guidance in handling all class
actions.
The proposed consumer fraud remedy attempts to modify the law
of fraud to adjust to the special factors present in retail transac-
t The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance and writing contribution of
J. Reuben Rigel, a 1973 graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law and presently a
staff attorney with the Legal Aid Society of Louisville, Inc., Louisville, Kentucky, in the
formulation of this article.
* LL.B., University of Virginia. Lieutenant Governor, the Commonwealth of Virginia.
1. This should not be taken to imply that reform in this area is not important.
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tions. The paradigm transaction involves the purchase of goods for
consumption by the average citizen. The merchant is usually in a
position to take advantage of the consumer by superior bargaining
power. The common law remedy for fraud is inadequate to redress
the imbalance of bargaining power among the parties to the para-
digm consumer sales transactions-nor does the Virginia Commer-
cial Code reach the subtle forms of deceptive sales practices, provid-
ing remedies only for breaches of warranties and express contract
terms.
2
The proposed class action and consumer fraud laws would be
complementary, the class action providing a practicable remedy for
a substantive right, and the consumer fraud law giving substantive
meaning to the class action law. Generally, common law fraud is not
considered an appropriate subject for the class action device.3 How-
ever, a recent California case allowed a class action in a fraud case,
where the fraud involved was almost identical in each situation.' An
action based upon common law fraud may be brought in Virginia
in federal court as a Rule 23 class action in very limited circumstan-
ces. Adoption of the state fraud law and class action procedure
would provide comprehensive protection to Virginia's consumers in
their own state courts.
The General Assembly of Virginia need not shrink from either of
these proposals, for they constitute moderate and measured reform.
Each should be introduced as a separate bill and considered on its
own merits. The class action bill would merely change procedures,
rather than substance, adopting a device familiar to most Virginia
lawyers from their practice in the federal courts in our state. The
consumer fraud bill merely requires merchants to tell the truth;
thus, the overwhelming majority of merchants, as well as the Retail
Merchants Association of Virginia, should want to remove the occa-
sional bad apple from the barrel. With these modest parameters in
mind, the business and legal communities of Virginia are invited to
consider the specific elements of these two proposals.
2. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-701 to -725 and 8.2-312 to -318 (1965).
3. Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1015 (1938).
4. Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94 Cal. Rptr. 799, 484
P.2d 964 (1971).
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II.
A. The Need for a Class Action Procedure
At least twelve states5 have adopted a class action procedure
based on the scheme of Federal Rule 23 (adopted in 1966) applicable
in the federal courts. The fifteen states6 who have class action proce-
dures based on "old" Federal Rule 23 are expected to update their
procedures soon. The significant innovations of "new" Rule 23 are
its provisions for class suits for damages and for a binding effect on
all who do not "opt out" of such suits. Many of the other types of
class actions were recognized at common law, so the new Rule has
no impact beyond damage suits. There are three principal argu-
ments for expansion of the federal class action device, which have
application to the adoption of a state class action law. The class
action device is an efficient means of litigating issues; it gives mean-
ing to many existing laws by providing a full remedy; and, finally,
it gives a group of small claimants a realistic chance of recovering
for injuries caused by a common defendant. The current debate on
the proposed federal consumer class action7 provides a full discus-
sion of the factors that ought to be considered before enacting a
state class action procedure, since a stateclass action procedure
would be used quite often to redress wrongs to retail consumers in
similar circumstances.
Those who feel that the class action device should not be ex-
panded to the consumer situation present various arguments
against class action suits for damages. It is said that the procedure
allows plaintiffs' lawyers to blackmail defendants. Defendants will
be afraid to litigate otherwise valid legal issues because of the fear
of losing and thereby being subjected to a very large judgment.
Plaintiffs will be able to assert questionable claims in a class action
5. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. Hamburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
Rule, 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 609, 631 n.133 (1971). The Maryland class action procedure is similar
to the new Federal Rule. Id. 630 n.128.
6. Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 626 n.94.
7. See Hearings on H.R. 14931, H.R. 14585, H.R. 14627, H.R. 14832, H.R. 15066, H.R.
15655, and H.R. 15656 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 43 (1970); Hearings
on S. 2246, S. 3092, and S. 3201 Before the Consumer-Subcommittee on Commerce, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 48, pt. 1 & 2 (1970).
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suit for damages, and they will be able to recover something, even
though their claims may have little merit. Opponents also argue
that the only valid claims will be against "fly by night" companies
and corporations with a low capitalization; therefore, since a class
action would not solve the problems caused by these companies, it
would be an ineffective device. Critics further contend that it will
not effectively bring about recovery for small claimants, citing var-
ious lengthy federal cases on this point.8 They also point to class
action cases where plaintiffs have sought to represent extremely
large groups to show the disruptive or disastrous results a class
action procedure can produce.' Finally, the opponents predict that
a class action law, applicable to retail fraud, will inhibit legitimate
business from developing and selling new products and operating in
a creative and flexible manner.
Those who favor the class action device submit that many of the
problems previously identified can be managed by the courts in
their administration of class actions. '" An "unmanageable" class
can be subdivided into smaller classes or the entire class action can
be dismissed as unmanageable. The courts can handle unwarranted
class suits as they do other unwarranted suits, through their sum-
mary judgment power and with their other discretionary powers."
Proponents of the class action device argue that it will have a salu-
tary effect on law enforcement, in that individuals and corporations
will become much more careful in their activities when there is a
possible legal challenge. Such a reduction in questionable activities
clearly will be beneficial. Advocates also marshall the fact that a
class action procedure does not change the substantive law, but
merely provides a remedy for an existing substantive right. Finally,
they challenge the allegation that large, well-capitalized businesses
8. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II), after remand, 41
U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir. May 1, 1973) (Eisen III).
9. The so-called Smog cases against the automobile manufacturers brought on behalf of
all residents of the United States are employed effectively in the argument against expansion
of the class action device. See also SPECIAL COMMrITEE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS, THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML
PROCEDURE, 6 (1972). It is to be expected that attorneys who normally defend against
consumer-oriented class actions have a natural bias against the maintenance of such actions.
10. This has been the practice under Rule 23 in federal courts. See West Virginia v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("The Drug Cases"), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir. 1971).
11. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:18.
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never or rarely are involved in sharp, possibly illegal practices; ad-
vocates prefer to provide consumers their day in court, as a class,
to test the legality of retail practices.
The arguments favoring a broad and flexible class action device
persuade one to recommend the adoption of a state class action law,
applicable to the vindication of consumer fraud. Where there are
substantive laws that our legislators and courts have promulgated
as public policy, there ought to be practical procedures for enforce-
ment of these laws when they are violated. As the Chancellor is wont
to chant, "For every right, there must be a remedy." This principle
is no less applicable when the violations have been suffered by a
class of persons. Although there might be plaintiffs bringing unwar-
ranted suits for their settlement value, the courts and bar associa-
tions are capable of policing such conduct. The slight possibility of
abuse is heavily outweighed by the value of providing relief for the
great majority of our citizens, in their capacity as consumers. A legal
system that provides legal relief only for large claimants and none
for those with small claims is inadequate, since the essence of justice
is equal treatment.' 2
B. Virginia Law on Class Actions
Virginia has no statute or court rule on representative or class
suits. Using their common law power, courts have allowed such suits
in some of the traditional class action situations. Suits for injunctive
relief against illegal taxes'3 or an administrative order" have been
allowed. It has been said that a group of policyholders can be bound
by prior representative adjudication. 5 Creditors, although their in-
terests were not exactly the same, were allowed to sue as a class to
obtain a new trustee under a deed of trust.'6 This sparse summary
indicates the extent of the case law in Virginia on class actions. It
is clear that the actual contours of the current Virginia class action
12. See the author's recent contribution on this subject, in the context of providing utility
consumers with as much access to appeals from rate making decisions as the utility compa-
nies enjoy. Howell, Financial Barriers To Public Participation In The Regulatory Process, 14
WMs. & MARY L. REv. 567 (1973).
13. Johnson v. Black, 103 Va. 477, 49 S.E. 633 (1905); Redd v. Henry County, 72 Va. 695
(1879); Bull v. Read, 54 Va. 78 (1855).
14. Blanton v. Southern Fertilizer Co., 77 Va. 335 (1883).
15. Morrow v. Vaughan-Bassatt Furniture Co., 173 Va. 417, 4 S.E.2d 399 (1939).
16. Reynolds v. Bank of Virginia, 47 Va. 174 (1849).
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procedures have not been defined. Legislative action in this area
would, at the least, eliminate the need for expensive litigation to
clarify the powers and limitations of our State's courts.
C. The Class Action Procedure Proposal
While the class actions proposal in Appendix A is based upon
Federal Rule 23, it does modify the Federal Rule as it relates to the
prerequisites for bringing an action under Subsection (b)(3)'7 and
the notice requirements.' 8 Because the proposed law is based on
Federal Rule 23, the experience of federal courts can serve as a
source of information for Virginia courts in their management of
class actions. Federal court experience demonstrates that the Fed-
eral Rule, despite its intimidating appearance, is quite workable.
The proposed law includes explanatory sections to clarify the ulti-
mate purposes of the law. Inclusion of these "purpose" and "com-
ments" sections conveys an implied request that the courts be flexi-
ble and imaginative in the management of class actions. A negative
attitude could effectively defeat the proposal after enactment, be-
cause much discretion is reposed in the trial court.
The requirement of Rule 23, in actions under Subsection (b)(3),
that the common questions predominate over the individual is-
sues,'" seems to be a harsh standard. Such a requirement could be
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3) provides that a class action is maintainable if:
[TIhe court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
18. The notice requirement of Rule 23 provides:
[lin any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, includ-
ing individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class
if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgement, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
Id. § (C)(2).
19. See note 17 supra.
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the basis for an ill-founded, but discretionary decision to dismiss a
meritorious class action. Therefore, the proposed law contains modi-
fications of the requirements of Federal Rule 23(b)(3), set forth in
Subsection II (C)(3), in Appendix A. Under the proposal, a (C)(3)
type class action ((b)(3) under Federal Rule 23) can be brought if
the common issues are a significant part of the action and all of the
other conditions are met. A court, in deciding whether or not to
allow a (C) (3) type class action, must consider, not only the form
factors given in Federal Rule 23 (b)(3), but, additionally, the plain-
tiff's chance of obtaining a legal remedy if the class action is not
allowed. Thereby, the proposal attempts to provide a presumption
in favor of a class action when significant common issues are pres-
ent, especially if the plaintiffs otherwise cannot obtain relief. The
proposed modification may constitute a recognition of current Fed-
eral Court practice under Federal Rule 23(b)(3). In Gold Strike
Stamp Co. v. Christensen,2 the court held that the common issues
predominated where the common issue was liability and the indi-
vidual issue was damages. In Green v. Wolf Corp.,2' the court said
that, even though there might be a question of the degree of individ-
ual entitlement by each plaintiff to establish his federal statutory
claim, the common issues predominated sufficiently for the case to
go forward under Federal Rule 23(b)(3). These cases constitute sub-
stantial authority for codification of the change embodied in
Subsection (C)(3) of the proposed state law.
D. The Notice Requirement in the Proposal
The notice provisions of this proposal are probably the most novel
contribution the author has attempted. They are keyed to the Fed-
eral Rule 23 requirements, but attempt to be more flexible than
under Federal Rule 23 (b)(3) type actions. Of most concern are the
basic and indispensable requirements of due process derived from
the Constitution of the United States2 and the Virginia Constitu-
tion,2 with regard to notice in class actions. The two United States
Supreme Court decisions relevant to this question are Hansberry v.
20. 436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1970).
21. 406 F.2d 291 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23. VA. CONST. art. 1 § 11.
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Lee2 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,25 which
speak to the application of due process in representative litigation.
Hansberry, which involved the binding effect of a preceding judg-
ment, held that the defendants in the case before it were not bound
by the preceding judgment, to which they had not been parties,
because their interests were not adequately represented in the pre-
ceding action. The Court implied that adequate representation for
absent parties in a class suit would be sufficient grounds to bind
them in a later action. In reaching its decision, the Court explained
that states enjoy flexibility in providing for res judicata effect in
class actions, saying in dictum:
...[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not compel state courts or
legislatures to adopt any particular rule for establishing the conclu-
siveness of judgments in class suits; . . . .nor does it compel the
adoption of the particular rules thought by this Court to be appropri-
ate for federal courts. With a proper regard for divergent local institu-
tions and interests . . . , this Court is justified in saying that there
has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot
be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of
the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it ... 2
The Court expressly limited its holding in Hansberry to the prop-
osition that inadequate representation in the class action would
defeat the operation of res judicata effects against an absent party.
Mullane involved a common trust fund under which an account-
ing was sought by the bank trustee. The statutory procedure pro-
vided for appointment of a guardian to protect the interest of the
beneficiaries in the legal proceedings and for notice to the benefici-
aries by newspaper publication. The Supreme Court held that due
process, under the fourteenth amendment, requires individual no-
tice to known beneficiaries, whereas publication notice will suffice
only for unknown or possible beneficiaries. The wording of Mullane
suggests that notice was required, in part, because the case involved
"substantial property rights."2 The drafters of Federal Rule 23 ap-
24. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
25. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
26. 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
27. 339 U.S. 306, 313, 320 (1950).
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parently felt that Mullane required individual notice to known
plaintiffs in situations that typically involve damages. As a result,
Federal Rule 23 includes required notice for class actions brought
under Subsection (b)(3) .28 The position advanced herein is that
Mullane does require notice in (b) (3) situations, but that the consti-
tutional requirement for notice is not as rigid as the wording of
(c)(2). The Mullane court speaks in terms of practical considera-
tions, which allow the trial court to dispense with individual notice
to absent parties where it is clear that their interests will be pro-
tected by others. Mullane should be read as saying due process
requires reasonable notice under the circumstances of the case. The
effect of the case is limited factually to a requirement of individual
notice to known beneficiaries of a common trust fund. Because
Mullane is merely a "representative action," commentators have
argued that the apparently rigid requirements for notice in Mullane
should not be applied to a true class action. 29
Reconciling Hansberry and Mullane presents difficulties. Some of
the language of Hansberry0 suggests strongly that a state procedure
that fairly protects the interests of absent class members would be
permissable under due process even if notice is not given to the
absent members. Mullane clearly holds that, where "substantial
property rights" are involved, notice to the interested parties is
required. A reading of the cases in this manner supports a rule
dispensing with notice in Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases, but
requiring notice in Subsection (b)(3) cases. The question remains as
to what type of notice is required by Mullane in Subsection (b)(3)
cases. A rule requiring "individual notice to known members" ap-
parently pursuant to Federal Rule 23 (c) (2) reflects a rigid reading
of Mullane. If such a rule is required by due process, then in situa-
tions involving small claims and numerous known claimants, the
claimants would often be precluded from legal relief because they
would be unable to risk the cost of notice that they would be re-
quired to provide. Such a requirement reduces, logically, to the
28. 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
29. Note, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29
MARYLAND L. REv. 139 (1969); Note, Civil Procedure-Federal Rule 23 (c)(2)-Notice in Class
Actions-Mullane Reconsidered, 43 TuL. L. REv. 369 (1969).
30. 311 U.S. at 42-43.
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proposition that due process requires that the claimants be left
without relief, a ridiculous result.
Lower federal courts have discussed the notice requirements for
class actions with different conclusions. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin (Eisen II), 31 the Second Circuit, in reversing a class action
dismissal, said, in dictum, that due process required notice in all
class actions.32
In the newest development in this protracted anti-trust class ac-
tion, Eisen III,"3 the same Second Circuit panel enforced its earlier
dictum and held that notice was required for all members of a class
who can be identified through a reasonable effort. The court decided
that the failure to give notice, based on the inability of the plaintiff-
class representative to bear the expenses of notifying over 6 million
class members (approximately 2,250,000 of them known), and the
unlawfulness of requiring the defendants to share most of that bur-
den, rendered the case "unmanageable" as a class action (a Rule 23
consideration). Thus, the case was dismissed except as an individ-
ual action.
The Eisen III court pointed out that the per capita expenses of
notice (as required by Rule 23) and the expenses of disbursement
of any possible award to members of the class, would exceed the
projected average claim of each of the 6 million members of about
$3.90 each. The court took a strict approach in construing Rule 23,
without any direct reference to the Mullane or Hansberry decisions,
with their more flexible approaches to class representation. Addi-
tionally, the court did not choose to take a position which would
allow it to take a more flexible approach to the notice requirement
in order to facilitate a remedy for an arguable wrong where expenses
exceed damages and present parties can adequately protect absent
members. Where notice would be an unreasonable burden, and the
absent parties would not be prejudiced by lack of notice, constitu-
tional due process considerations should not require such individual
notice.
Since Eisen III speaks only to the requirements of Federal Rule
23, and not directly to the constitutional requirements of notice, and
31. 391 F.2d 555 (2nd Cir. 1968).
32. Id. 564.
33. See note 8 supra.
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since there are contrary decisions in other jurisdictions, 34 the case
may proceed to an en banc Second Circuit decision, and possibly
to decision in the United States Supreme Court. In the meantime,
Eisen III should not affect the General Assembly's deliberation,
especially in view of the contrary decisions.
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit, in Hammond v. Powell,35 held
that notice is not required in a class action under Federal Rule 23
(b) (2). Clearly, then, the lower federal courts have not treated dis-
positively the constitutional due process requirements of notice in
all types of class action cases.
The approach adopted in the proposed state class action law is
based on the above interpretation of Hansberry and Mullane. It is
very similar to the approach adopted in Federal Rule 23, except that
it attempts to give the court more discretion where notice is manda-
tory thereby conforming to Federal practice, as discussed above.
While Rule 23 requires notice to those class members who can be
identified through "reasonable effort," the proposal herein would
require notice to those "members who can be notified through rea-
sonable effort." Such an approach constitutes substantial compli-
ance with due process requirements.
II.
A. The Need for a Consumer Fraud Law
The purchase of consumer goods in our society is a cornerstone of
its economic structure. The theory of our free enterprise system is
that competition and informed decision-making by purchasers will
produce an ever-improving flow of goods. A seller producing a better
product or selling at a lower price will attract more customers (as-
suming a good flow of information) and thereby will be rewarded for
his better effort. Merchants who lose business will be encouraged to
attract new business. This ideal system will not operate optimally,
where (a) participants can combine together in anticompetitive
agreements, and (b) sellers can deceive purchasers into buying their
products by using untrue statements. The Sherman Antitrust Act
34. Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. La. 1970) and Pasquier v. Tarr,
318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970). These cases add little since they are both from the same
court, and in both, the judges were more interested in the results than any theoretical base.
35. 262 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972).
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makes such agreements illegal36 and allows treble damage civil suits
by aggrieved parties37 to carry out the Act's purpose. There is no
similar federal or Virginia legislation with regard to deceptive prac-
tices. 8 Common law fraud, with all of its special rules, is designed
to cover persons in relatively equal bargaining positions, providing
adequate relief in transactions involving wholesalers, dealers, mid-
dlemen, and other distributors. When the retail consumer is in-
volved, he is often poorly informed and lacks any special knowledge
about the products he buys. His seller often holds superior knowl-
edge about the products he sells, has greater resources, and thus
holds a superior bargaining position in the transaction with the
consumer. Although consumer groups have made strides in assisting
individual consumers to make informed judgements before pur-
chase, a seller typically knows the demands of the market and the
law, while the consumer knows very little about either. A compre-
hensive fraud law for consumers, including civil suits for injured
consumers, would be an effective device to make the system work
optimally, thereby eliminating fraudulent and deceptive practices.
It is appropriate to consider examples of situations to be covered
by the proposed law, but which are not now covered by the common
law of fraud. An occasional salesman may sometimes deceive a con-
sumer about the meaning of a written form or contract. It is rare for
a consumer to challenge the salesman, or attempt to read and inter-
pret the document at the time of the transaction. Such a practice
by a salesman would not be actionable under common law since the
consumer did not justifiably rely, since the law requires the con-
sumer to read the form. A store through its advertisements or sales-
men's statements may say that an appliance is a "good buy" at its
price, when, in fact, the price is excessive. A misrepresentation of
opinion is not actionable under common law fraud, but could give
rise to a cause of action under a consumer fraud law. Consumers
sometimes are misled into purchasing an item on the pretense that
they have won a contest and they are thereby entitled to a reduced
price. While such a scheme might not amount to a common law
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
38. There was an unsuccessful attempt in the 1973 session of the General Assembly to
provide for attorney's fees in consumer actions and to set venue for such actions in House
Bills 1401 and 1403. While the Federal Trade Commission can prosecute for deceptive adver-
tising, under Federal law, consumers cannot. 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-56.
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fraud, but it certainly is very deceptive to many consumers, and
would be actionable under the proposed law.
There is precedent for developing a specialized fraud law to cover
a defined subject area, and allowing civil suits for damages. A whole
body of "securities fraud law" has developed under Rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 31 including the remedy of civil
suits for damages for vindication of abuses of the superior position
of "insiders" in this specialized area. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion regulates advertising "affecting commerce", and prosecutes
those who broadcast or publish deceptive claims. 0
Other states have developed special schemes for handling the
consumer fraud problem. California law provides a list of deceptive
practices that are made illegal,4 ' and allows consumer suits for dam-
ages flowing from these practices, 42 including punitive damages.4 3
This type of approach gives merchants a fair warning but it seems
unlikely that all possible deceptive practices can be enumerated.
Before suit, under the California law, the consumer must request
adjustment from the merchant and thereby give him a chance to
remedy the alleged abuse.4 4 Under New Jersey law, deceptive prac-
tices are made illegal. 5 Consumer suits are allowed without condi-
tion46 and the Attorney General can obtain injunctions against the
unlawful practices in a summary action. 47 A consumer fraud law in
Kentucky is similar to the one in New Jersey. Since other states
have provided their consumers with the protection of a specialized
consumer fraud law, it is modest to propose that the consumers of
Virginia be provided similar relief.
B. Virginia Law on Fraud
A detailed analysis of the Virginia law on fraud is not necessary;
39. For an excellent source book on this topic, see A. BROMBER, SECURITIES LAW-
FRAD-SEC RULE 10b-5 (1971).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-56 (1970).
41. CAL. CVL CODE § 1770 (West 1973).
42. Id. § 1780.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 1782.
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (1964).
46. Id. § 56:8-19.
47. Id. § 56:8-8.
48. Ky. REV. STAT. § 367.120 et seq. (1972).
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but, a brief overview will assist in the analysis of the consumer law
proposal. The law of fraud in Virginia departs from the majority
common law rule of fraud, in that scienter is not required. 9 The law
requires that there be a material misrepresentation of a fact,5" on
which the plaintiff justifiably relies and is thereby damaged.5' The
misrepresentation must be of a contemporary fact and not as to an
anticipation of future events. 2 A misrepresentation by a statement
of an opinion or a future promise generally will not amount to
fraud.13 As an exception to the non-scienter rule, silence must be
willful to be a misrepresentation." Finally, in order to have action-
able fraud, the reliance on the misrepresentation of the defendant
by a plaintiff must be reasonable or justifiable.5
C. The Consumer Fraud Law Proposal
The fraud law proposal provides for an expanded definition of
fraud applicable in the consumer context, civil suits for damages
thereunder, awards of attorney's fees and costs to winning consum-
ers, punitive damages for knowing violations, suits for injunctions
by the Attorney General against fraudulent practices, and an ex-
emption of advertisers from civil liability.
The proposed law modernizes the fraud law applicable to the
consumer transaction. Scienter is not required, consistent with the
current Virginia fraud law, rendering merchants strictly liable for
their deceptive practices. A negligence standard could have been
employed, but such a standard would have imposed an additional
burden on the consumer plaintiff. Furthermore, strict liability will
49. B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 99 S.E.2d 606 (1957);
Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 95 S.E.2d 207 (1956); Union Trust Corp. v.
Fugate, 172 Va. 82, 200 S.E. 624 (1939); Chandler v. Russell, 164 Va. 318, 180 S.E. 313 (1935).
See also Note, A Sellers Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation in Virginia, 43 VA. L. REV.
765 (1957).
50. Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 95 S.E.2d 207 (1956); Dudley v. Minor,
100 Va. 728, 42 S.E. 870 (1902); Grosh v. Ivanhoe Land Co., 95 Va. 161, 27 S.E. 841 (1897).
51. Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 210 Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264 (1969);
Harris v. Dunham, 203 Va. 760, 127 S.E.2d 65 (1962).
52. Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 210 Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264 (1969);
Barnes v. Barnes, 207 Va. 114, 148 S.E.2d 789 (1966); DeJarnette v. Thomas M. Brook
Lumber Co., 199 Va. 18, 97 S.E.2d 750 (1957).
53. Id.
54. Rison v. Newberry, 90 Va. 513, 18 S.E. 916 (1894).
55. See note 51 supra.
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provide a strong incentive for the elimination of arguably deceptive
practices. However, a misrepresentation must be material for civil
liability to arise, so strict liability is not as harsh a rule to the mer-
chant as it might appear. Since reliance is irrebutably presumed,
materiality is a minimum requirement, which is also consistent with
the Virginia common law of fraud. The proposed consumer fraud
law also departs from the common law by defining misrepresen-
tations as including misrepresentations of other than current facts.
Since the purpose of the law is to prevent deceptions causing actual
injury to consumers, a common sense approach to the term "decep-
tion" is adopted. Finally, consumers need not be required to show
reliance to recover under the proposed law, thus eliminating the
obstacle in common law fraud of "justifiable" reliance. Under the
common law, when consumers are deceived, they cannot recover if
the law postulates that they should not have relied. The proposed
law presumes the reliance of a consumer when a deceptive practice
is directed at him. The law has a prophylactic effect, assuring that
a merchant who deceives will lose under any circumstances. The
assurance of recovery to deceived consumers and the salutary ef-
fects on merchants' practices outweigh the negative factor of possi-
ble, but unlikely, recovery by uninjured plaintiffs.
In summary, the proposed law requires as a condition to recovery,
that a consumer must show that a materially deceptive practice was
aimed at him, and that because of such deception he was injured.
If the deception was not directed to him, he must also show reliance.
An understanding of the proposed law can be obtained by consid-
ering a few examples. Egregious cases of consumer deception are
now covered by common law fraud, but the proposed law would
make proof easier for plaintiffs in such cases. For example, a misre-
presentation by a salesman of the contents or effect of a form or
contract to be signed would be actionable under the proposal if it
were material. A false sales price or a false discount, such as a
"contest prize," would probably be a material misrepresentation
and therefore actionable. Sometimes sellers attempt to make the
distribution of their product look like something other than a mere
selling scheme. The seller may state that the product is being placed
in the consumer's house for advertisement purposes, and that the
householder will be liable only for costs. In fact, the consumer is
buying the product at a retail price and the seller is not concerned
about the advertisement. Such schemes would be actionable.
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Various mechanisms are available for controlling conduct in our
society, including criminal sanctions, civil liability, and administra-
tive orders and fines. While there is a Virginia statute making de-
ceptive or misleading advertising a misdemeanor," the activities
within the scope' of the proposed law are not the type that should
be stigmatized with the criminal sanction. Often, when business
practices are criminalized, prosecuters fail to prosecute under such
laws. The power of administrative agencies in stopping consumer
fraud has often been questioned. It has been said that the work of
the Federal Trade Commission in the area of consumer protection,
while praiseworthy, is not sufficient to protect the public from de-
ceptive practices. 7 Administrative agencies, subject to funding,
staff and policy limitations, often are not as aggressive as necessary
and their cost is passed along to the consumer. In contrast, civil
suits, unlike criminal sanctions and administrative procedures, pro-
vide monetary relief for parties injured by past practices, and im-
pose a meaningful deterrent to such deceptive practices.
Allowance of civil remedies, along with awarding attorney's fees
and costs to the winning injured party, has proven to be an effective
means in other areas of enforcing laws.5" Such a procedure taps the
skills of the private bar in a way that benefits society, the injured
party, and the private attorneys. Awarding of fees and costs only on
the side of the winning consumer provides incentive for the chal-
lenging of questionable commercial tactics. Unwarranted suits and
the conduct of irresponsible attorneys should be handled in a sepa-
rate procedure, not by punishing injured plaintiffs through the de-
nial of their remedy.
The punitive damages for a knowing violation attempts to penal-
ize defendants in egregious cases. A treble damage award in all cases
would increase deterrence, but it could be unfair in an action based
upon a rule of strict liability. Any undue harshness in the proposed
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-44 (1973 Repl. Vol.). The author acknowledges the effort of the
General Assembly in the area of consumer protection reflected in several provisions in Title
59.1 of the Code of Virginia. However, these existing laws are not sufficiently comprehensive
to cover the full range of deceptive practices that confront the consumer. For an example of
the range of typical deceptive practices, see H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1969).
57. See note 6 supra.
58. See applicable provisions allowing suits by persons injured by violations of federal anti-
trust law. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See also Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)
where fees are recoverable but costs are not.
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law may be modulated by the discretionary powers of the courts in
identifying knowing violations and setting damages.
Under the proposal, the Attorney General may seek ex parte or-
ders when deceptions are in progress, a measure designed to be
prophylactic and to encourage the Attorney General's staff to de-
velop expertise in this area of the law.
Finally, the proposed law exempts the communication media
from civil liability when they publish a merchant's misrepresen-
tations. This exception may be redundant, since, to be liable, a
person must "use" an illegal practice. However, it is important to
assure that the media is relieved of the undue burden of legally
scrutinizing its advertisements for deceptive practices. The princi-
pal thrust of the law is to hold unethical sellers liable, thus reaching
the source of the problem.
IV.
Conclusion
The two proposals developed above, in support of the appended
legislation, are intended to provide important protection to the pe-
cuniary and proprietary interests of everyone who resides in our
Commonwealth, from the laborer to the corporate president, from
the student to the retired pensioner. The government is ordained
not only to serve and protect the majority, the strong and the
wealthy, but also to make the system work for everyone, including
the poor, the weak, and the uneducated. This principle of
government was articulated long ago by the great Virginian, George
Mason. His words have found expression in our state Constitution,
Article I, Sections One and Three. They serve as the lodestar for all
public servants of this Commonwealth and are an implicit mandate
for the passage of these and similar laws designed to protect the
consumer.
Section 1. Equality and rights of men.
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inherent rights ... namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.
Section 3. Government instituted for common benefit.
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people .... that is best
which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and
safety. . ..
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APPENDIX A
Class Action Procedure Law
I. Purpose.
This law is designed to give Virginia courts a procedure that they
can use in order to provide remedies to small claimants who would
otherwise be unable to secure them because of the smallness of their
claims or the cost of litigation. It will also assist the courts in han-
dling cases efficiently and in avoiding unnecessary litigation.
II. The Procedure.
A. Coverage. This procedure may be used in any legal or equita-
ble proceeding in the courts of Virginia where the requirements of
the rule are met.
B. Prerequisites of a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all,
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
C. Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as
a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision B are satisfied, and
in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,
or
(b) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
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grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that a significant part of the action involves
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
to the court's findings include: (a) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the liti-
gation of the claims in the particular forum; (d) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action; (e)
the difficulties likely to be encountered by members of the class or
the party opposing the class in obtaining adequate equitable or legal
relief if a class action is not allowed.
D. Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Main-
tained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially As Class
Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether
it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on
the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision C(3) the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practic-
able under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be notified through reasonable effort. In deter-
mining what notice is practicable under the circumstances, the
court shall consider the size and importance of the individual inter-
ests of each member of the class and the difficulties these members
will have in obtaining equitable or legal relief under a particular
notice requirement. The notice shall advise each member that (a)
the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (c) any
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through counsel.
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(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision C(1) or C(2), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be
members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision C(3), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice
provided in subdivision D(2) was directed, and who have not re-
quested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (a) an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (b) a
class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
E. Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evi-
dence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members
of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice
be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of
the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)
imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;
(4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the ac-
tion proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural mat-
ters. The orders may be combined with a pre-trial order formulating
issues, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from
time to time.
F. Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and no-
tice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
G. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction for any action brought as a class
action shall be based on the underlying cause of action and the
aggregate amount of claims asserted where appropriate.
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II. Comments on the Class Action Procedure Law.
The rure given draws heavily on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. Reference can profitably be made to the Advisory Committee's
Note at 39 F.R.D. 98-107. Also the courts in working under the rule
can look to federal precedent for guidance. It should be kept in
mind, however, that the rule given is a Virginia rule and therefore
Virginia courts will be the final authority on what it means.
The major change made by the rule in Virginia law is that the
appropriateness of a class action is determined by a functional anal-
ysis. Suits for damages can be brought if they meet the criteria of
C(3). The rule also gives courts guidance in handling all class ac-
tions.
Section A indicates that the class action procedure is available for
all types of claims.
Sections B, C(1), C(2), D(1), D(3), D(4), E and F are the same
as (a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(4), (d) and (e) respectively
of Federal Rule 23. They are designed to give the trial court maxi-
mum flexibility in processing a class action case. This flexibility
should be used to carry out the purpose for which the legislation is
enacted.
Section C(3) modifies (b)(3) of Federal Rule 23 somewhat. Com-
mon questions of law or fact have to be a significant part of the
action but do not have to necessarily predominate over individual
questions as required by (b)(3) of Rule 23. In making a determina-
tion as to the maintenance of a class action under C(3), a court
must consider the chance that the plaintiffs' claim may never be
asserted if a class action is not allowed.
Section D(2) modifies (c)(2) of Rule 23 significantly. Under D(2)
notice is required in C(3) actions but flexibility is allowed. Even
though members of the class can be easily identified, individual
notice will not be required unless it is reasonable considering the
circumstances.
The two changes made to Rule 23, spoken of above, may be close
to what the federal courts have interpreted the actual wording of
Rule 23 to mean. In any case the changed wording clarifies the
situation.
Section F attempts to prevent any jurisdictional problem that
might otherwise develop.
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APPENDIX B
Consumer Fraud Law
I. Purpose.
This law is designed to provide consumers with comprehensive
protection from and a remedy for those practices of their sellers that
are fraudulent, deceptive or unfair. It attempts to modify the law
of fraud otherwise applicable to the consumer situation to more
accurately reflect the reality of that situation.
II. Illegal Practices; Suits by Injured Persons.
It shall be illegal for any person in a retail transaction involving
the purchase, sale or lease of goods or services by a retail consumer
to use any fraudulent, deceptive or unfair practice. Any retail con-
sumer who shall be injured by reason of the use by a person of any
such practice may sue such person in any appropriate court of Vir-
ginia and shall recover damages sustained by him or shall obtain
such other relief that may be appropriate.
III. Attorney's Fees and Costs.
In any suit hereunder in which relief is awarded to the retail
consumer, the court shall award to him attorney's fees and the
reasonable costs of litigation.
IV. Punitive Damages.
In any suit in which it is found that the defendant has used a
fraudulent, deceptive or unfair practice against a retail consumer
and that such defendant knew that the practice was fraudulent,
deceptive or unfair, then the retail consumer shall be awarded in
addition to his actual damages an additional amount equal to two
times such damages as punitive damages against the defendant.
V. Injunction Against Unlawful Practices.
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any
person is using, has used, or is about to use any practice declared
by Section II to be illegal, and that proceedings would be in the
public interest, he may immediately move in the name of the Com-
monwealth in an appropriate court for a restraining order, or tempo-
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rary or permanent injunction to prohibit the use of such practice.
A restraining order shall be granted whenever it reasonably appears
that any person will suffer immediate harm, loss, or injury from an
illegal practice. If the defendant moves for the dissolution of a re-
straining order, the court shall hold a hearing within five business
days of defendant's motion. If such hearing does not occur through
no fault of the defendant, then the restraining order shall be dis-
solved automatically. In order to obtain a temporary or permanent
injunction, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that an ade-
quate remedy at law does not exist, or that irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result if the injunctive relief is denied.
VI. Definitions.
The following definitions apply to the Consumer Fraud Law:
A. A retail consumer is one who obtains goods or services
through purchase or lease in a commercial setting not for resale or
leasing to others but for his or his household's or friend's use.
B. A fraudulent, deceptive or unfair practice shall be any decep-
tion, fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation,
whether or not innocently done. An omission, concealment or sup-
pression may be a fraudulent, deceptive or unfair practice. A false
or deceptive practice as to present or future opinions, facts or laws
may be a fraudulent, deceptive or unfair practice. In order for a
practice to be actionable under Section II, it must be deceptive as
to a material aspect of the retail transaction. If an illegal practice
has been proven and the practice was directed at a retail consumer,
then the reliance of such consumer on such practice shall be pre-
sumed and no evidence will be allowed to rebut such reliance.
VII. Exception.
No owner, publisher or operator of any communications media
shall be held liable for injuries under Section II for any advertise-
ment in such media unless such person had knowledge of the frau-
dulant, deceptive or unfair intent, design or purpose of the adver-
tiser.
VIII. Comments on the Consumer Fraud Law.
The law attempts to stop consumer frauds through civil suits and
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orders obtained by the Attorney General and to provide relief for
injured parties.
The Attorney General will primarily be concerned with stopping
frauds before they occur or before many people are injured. It should
be noted that he can obtain orders against deceptions that are not
material. Civil suits would not be allowable in such cases. VI B.
Any party who uses an illegal practice which results in injury can
be sued except advertisers. VII. Judicial limitations on this provi-
sion would be appropriate if they are consistent with the purpose of
the law.
An injured party hereunder must show significantly less than is
required by the common law of fraud in order to get relief. He must
show (1) a deception or fraud, (2) its materiality and (3) that it was
directed toward him. (If he cannot show (3) but can show his reli-
ance, then he can recover.)
Most of the law is direct and clear and the courts will be carrying
out its intent if they adhere strictly to the express terms of the law.
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